destruction (The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command [SBCCOM], 1999a) . Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon s have the potential to inflict a massive number of casualtie s.
The first section of this article focuses on general knowledge about the psychological consequence s of natural and technological disasters involving civilians. This section will also include some findings from studies that have investigated the impact of combat exposure on military personnel and the effects of repeated secondary trauma exposures in emergency workers. The authors also consider the lessons learned from the few investigations of previous terrorist attacks on civilians employing chemical and bioweapons, and the aftermath of the conventional terrorist attack on civilian employees at the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.
Based on this selected review of the literature, some tentative general ization s about likel y psychological and beha vioral respon ses to biological and chemical terrori st atta cks on nonmilitary populations are made, alon g with recommendations for occupational health nurses. (This review article focu ses on BCW and doe s not include a review of what is known about psychological respon ses to the threat of or responses to an actual nuclear or radiological agent, except incidentally.) Thi s review articl e relie s heavily on examples in the literature to help occupational health nurse s learn the critical lessons from past disasters so they might avoid, or at least partiall y mitigate , such untoward psychological and behavioral con sequences in survivors of any potential future SCW terrori st event.
The first exemplar is from the Gulf War a decade ago and describes civilian psychological and behavioral responses to the imminent threat of a BCW event. During the Gulf War, Iraq launched Scud missiles on civilian targets in Israel. The Scud missile was considered an inaccurate weapon, but when aimed at population centers, missiles were likely to hit with enough precision to cause damage. Also, if armed with chemical or biological weapons, Scud missiles could cause massive numbers of casualties. Israelis prepared for potential BCW attacks and had to master the use of gas masks. When missile alerts sounded, often at night, residents listened to radio instructions to learn whether they should go to air raid shelters or to sealed rooms as a defense against a possible chemical agent.
Researchers reported the identified disorders of 773 Israeli civilians taken to emergency departments at 12 Israeli hospitals during or immediately following Scud missile attacks. Though the threat of BCW clearly existed, no chemical or biological agents were on any of the Scud missile warheads. Nonetheless, 43% of those Israeli citizens admitted to hospitals during the Scud missile attacks were diagnosed as "psychological casualties," and 27% of the total seen had mistakenly injected themselves with the nerve gas antidote they had been provided (Bleich, 1992) . Another study of the Israeli populace before, during, and after the Scud missile attacks, associated with the Gulf War found a 250% increase in the risk for clinical depression during the period of the Scud missile attacks. Individuals at greatest risk were the less educated, middle aged women in the Israeli population (Lomranz, 1994) .
DEFINING TERRORISM, BIOTERRORISM, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM
Terrorism is defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the unlawful use of force or violence committed...against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government (or) the civilian populations...in furtherance of political or social objectives (Soldier and Biological Chemical Command [SBCCOM], I999a).
Bioterrorism is defined as a terrorist action that employs the use of naturally occurring (or potentially modified) pathogens as a bioweapons to infect and cause illness in a targeted population (Gwerder, 2001) . Terrorism using chemical warfare agents usually involves the use of some harmful or lethal industrial or nonindustrial chemical (or chemical agents). These chemicals are released or disseminated with the goal of causing massive numbers of casualties, symptoms, or death in a targeted population (SBCCOM, 1999b) .
The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC and the subsequent anthrax incidents on the eastern seaboard met the FBI's definition of terrorism and bioterrorism and all targeted workplaces in the United States. Most profoundly affected were employees at work that day (or in the case of anthrax, the days and weeks of the events). The vast majority of the victims were simply APRIL 2002, VOL. 50, NO.4 employees doing their jobs when the attacks occurred. Companies or organizations who had offices at the World Trade Center or nearby on September 11, or those who had direct business dealings with those housed at the World Trade Center were actual victims or co-victims of the attacks.
A special set of victims were First Responders and rescue workers dispatched to the World Trade Center or to the Pentagon (and, later, those dispatched to or who served at "Ground Zero" [the remains of the collapsed World Trade Center towers]). These employee groups and related co-victims felt, and perhaps still feel, a greater sense of connection to the events of September 11, and were probably more likely to experience a more profound psychological reaction than those who were not so intimately connected with the events (Hanchar, 2001) . In the context of these unforgettable televised (or worse yet, real life, real time) images of the carnage and aftermath, Americans (many for the first time in their lives) were confronted with the notion that they are vulnerable at their workplaces and in their communities-in their "homeland."
For many, along with this heightened sense of vulnerability came a sense of dread, increased vigilance, and the unfamiliar threats of domestic BCW attacks perpetrated by terrorists. Adding to this apprehension was the acknowledgement by U.S. government officials and public health scientists alike that BCW events are sometimes difficult to detect and diagnose in a timely fashion. Many of the likely chemical agents and bioweapon pathogens terrorists are likely to employ are colorless, odorless, silent, and potentially lethal.
Although there is no recent precedent in this country, biological agents have actually been used as weapons in warfare for centuries (Gwerder, 2001) . Chemical agents, such as mustard gas and phosgene, were widely used as weapons during World War I (Gilchrist, 1933) . The potential for BCW agents to instill fear in the general populace is magnified by their ability to inflict harm without being readily detectable. Potential for panic, social unrest, and economic dislocation exist in the aftermath of an actual BCW attack.
Some of the biological agents pose the potential for person to person transmission (SBCCOM, 1999b) . Not only are BCW agents sometimes difficult to detect in a timely fashion, they are also difficult to defend against. Most civilians are vulnerable to most, if not all, of these BCW agents (Tucker, 1997) . Table 1 summarizes some key, potentially anxiety provoking, components of BCW agents likely to be used in terrorist attacks. Yet, on the other hand, it is currently known the symptoms, syndromes, or diseases caused by many of these BCW agents are not necessarily fatal. In fact, most of them result in treatable symptoms, syndromes, or illnesses and in some cases, may be completely preventable (Centers for Disease Control [CDC], 2001) . Finally, all of the known potential biological agents that might be used as weapons by terrorists have historically been effectively treated by the U.S. public health system. In the case of small pox for instance, the agent has been effectively eradicated. • Imperceptible, and undetectable-some chemical and all biologic agents are invisible, odorless, colorless and silent. Human (or animal) signs and symptoms may be first (or only) clues.
• Man made technological disasters (vs. natural disasters).
• Intentional malevolent disasters (vs. unintentional malevolent disasters).
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM
The impact of biological and chemical terrorism can best be understood in the context of previous research, which documented outcomes of exposure to a variety of traumatic events. Traumatic events are typically unexpected and uncontrollable and can result in abnormal reactions in "normal" individuals. By definition, exposure to traumatic events includes experiencing or being confronted with actual or threatened death or injury to self or others (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). Type I traumatic events are abrupt and of brief duration (i.e., lasting a few minutes or hours), and are referred to as short term traumatic events. In contrast, Type II traumatic events are prolonged, repeated, or ongoing traumatic events (Terr, 1991) .
Type I events include natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods, hurricanes), accidental disasters (e.g., vehicular accidents, airplane crashes), and deliberately caused human made disasters (e.g., bombings, school massacres, arson fires, terrorist activities). Certainly terrorist campaigns, or a series of events-especially if they are long term-might also qualify as Type II traumatic events. Previous studies have shown deliberate, intentional malevolent acts, such as terrorist attacks, specifically designed to cause harm to others, result in more severe psychological consequences (Murphy, 1999a) . Before the psychological outcomes of trauma are described, it is helpful to consider some relevant theoretical models. To better understand likely and known psychological responses to threats of and actual extreme stressors, such as a BCW incident, three theoretical models of stress, trauma, and coping are described in the next section. Roy's (1989) adaptation model hypothesizes that human responses to stressors include both adaptive and 184 maladaptive reactions. Not all behavioral and psychological responses to potential or actual traumatic events are maladaptive. For instance, the primitive biobehavioral "fight or flight" response might well be adaptive in the event of an actual chemical attack. Furthermore, some apprehension and concern may well be appropriate responses to the threat of BCW events, especially if they serve to motivate problem solving, planning, and thoughtful policymaking. It is important to note there are large individual differences in the way people respond to trauma, presumably including threats of and actual BCW events.
HUMAN RESPONSES TO THREAT AND EXTREME STRESSORS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Some individuals appear to be hardier than others and may be able to function in the face of extreme trauma, such as a BCW attack. Likewise, especially in the aftermath, social support seeking and communication are seen as healthy adaptive responses to trauma. In the immediate aftermath of most disasters, including September II, the "best" in humanity actually becomes more evident. Strangers help strangers, and society becomes more cohesive. People adapt and divert their energies to respond to the disaster needs (Mileti, 200 I) .
On the other hand, disaster research has found mass violence is the most psychologically disturbing type of disaster and of those individuals directly exposed to such a disaster, perhaps two thirds (67%) Also observed in the aftermath of large scale traumatic events in those directly impacted are chronic problems in living, family strains and conflicts, and job stress (Green, 1994) .
Lazarus ' (1984) theoretical model of coping and threat appraisal proposed that in response to a potential threat, humans pose two questions to themselves: • Is there a real threat? • If there is a real threat, can I cope with it?
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September II and the subsequent anthrax bioterrorism incidents, the answer to the first threat appraisal question is currently "possibly," with varying degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity. One might conceive of the subjective threat appraisal process as a continuum extending from a minimal, or only theoretical threat, to a very real imminent threat (such as the way an Israeli resident might have felt during a Scud missile attack). An individual's response to the second threat appraisal question depends not only on one's answer to the first question ("Is there a threat?"), but also on the nature of the BCW threat and the appraised possibility or probability of an actual event in their community. Their appraisal of whether or not they can cope with a specific threat clearly depends on a variety of factors including accurate, up to date information about the prevention and remedial treatment efforts in response to a BCW attack. The answer to the threat appraisal question also depends on the risk profile and vulnerability of a particular workplace.
In the aftermath of a major BCW attack, potentially with massive casualties, survivors likely experience metacognitive changes characterized by Janoff-Bulman (1992) as "shattered assumptions." These shattered assumptions are: • The world is safe. • The world is predictable. • Bad things do not happen to good people.
Operating without these fundamental cogrutive assumptions, people are more likely to feel constantly threatened as well as alienated and psychologically distressed. If these BCW threats are numerous, inescapable, or uncontrollable punishing attacks, civilian survivors might show signs of learned helplessness, demoralization, and depression (Seligman, 1975) .
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO PRIOR BCW TRAUMATIC EVENTS

Three Mile Island
Three Mile Island is an example of a much studied technological disaster event that resulted in enduring psychological effects on those who lived nearby. Three Mile Island was really the first technological disaster, which led researchers to conclude there was something clearly "different" about manmade, technological disasters. On March 28, 1979, Pennsylvanians and residents in nearby states were threatened with a potential nuclear disaster caused by a series of operational problems at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor. Community responses to the potential meltdown of the nuclear reactor and radioactive releases from Three Mile Island were assessed.
Three Mile Island exposed community residents to radioactive releases (actual traumatic events), and to the ongoing threat of more releases or of a catastrophic plant "meltdown." The resultant adverse health effects on people in the surrounding community could best be characterized as chronic stress syndromes. Individuals who lived near Three Mile Island reported feeling more anxiety, experiencing more somatic symptoms, and feeling more alienated. Investigators also documented psychophysiological dysregulation in nearby community residents for up to 5 years following the containment and cleanup of Three Mile Island (Baum, 1983) . It is worth noting that the Three Mile Island event was an unintentional manmade technological disaster.
The Sarin Gas Attack on the Tokyo SUbway
On March 20, 1995, eleven 20 ounce vinyl bags of sarin, a deadly neurotoxin, were placed on five different trains of Tokyo's heavily traveled subway system. Only nine of the bags were punctured and released the contents. The sarin nerve agent attack was an intentionally caused chemical terrorist event that highlighted the many challenges confronting both First Responders and community residents in the aftermath of a BCW or weapons APRIL 2002, VOL. 50, NO.4 of mass destruction attack. Although the chemical agent was of poor quality, the dissemination inefficient, and only a small amount of the toxic nerve agent released, 13 people died, more than 1,000 experienced some degree of acute or chronic nerve gas exposure, and another 4,500 were considered psychological casualties.
The group of "worried well" individuals only thought they were experiencing symptoms of sarin gas exposure. According to one follow up report, many of those involved in the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack still reportedly suffered from some physical or mental symptom for at least I year following the attack (Okumura, 1998b). Because the incident was not recognized as a nerve agent exposure for several hours, a mass decontamination was not performed. As a result, 135 fire fighters and emergency medical service personnel (10% of the responders) suffered secondary contamination, and 20% of receiving hospital staff suffered effects from secondary exposure (Okumura, 1998a).
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO INTENTIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS
The Oklahoma City Bombing
The bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995 was the most severe incident of terrorism ever experienced in the United States prior to the September 11, 2001. A large conventional incendiary device (i.e., a bomb) exploded outside the Murrah Federal Building. The device, detonated by a terrorist (or terrorists) killed 168 people, including 19 children. Although it did not involve BCW, the Oklahoma City event has been studied extensively and provides valuable information pertaining to human responses to terrorist events. It also provides guidelines for health providers' responses needed to assist affected individuals and communities.
For example, Maningas (1997) documented the emergency medical service efforts used to treat nonfatally injured victims (93% of those in the building at the time of the bombing). The post-event survivors' emotional distress was profound; 45% of all adult survivors experienced a post-event psychiatric disorder (pre-event rates were controlled in the study design). In addition, 34% of the survivors met diagnostic criteria for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The onset of PTSD symptoms was sudden and very unusual, with 76% of those exposed to the event reporting same day onset (North, 1999) . In a follow up study conducted 1Yz to 3 years after the blast, 30% of the injured in the Oklahoma City bombing (n = 494) reported being diagnosed with audio logic deficits, anxiety, and depression. These findings suggested the occurrence of both delayed and chronic PTSD and serious psychological consequences of impaired hearing. The most frequently used health services post-event was counseling (63%) (Shariat, 1999) .
Primary and Secondary Trauma Responses in Emergency and Health Care Personnel
According to Figley (1995) , secondary traumatic stress (STS) is the natural consequent behaviors and emotions resulting from knowing about a traumatizing event experienced by a significant other-the stress resulting from helping or wanting to help a traumatized or suffering person. Secondary traumatic stress differs from a primary stress response because of the indirectness of the experience with the event. Limited data comparing these two phenomena suggest individuals in either group may meet one or more Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) criteria (APA, 1994) for PTSD. In addition, or in place of PTSD, emergency or rescue personnel may experience burnout. Symptoms of burnout include physical illnesses, interpersonal problems with colleagues, and erosion of job performance. Additionally, rescue workers may need to contend with large numbers of worried well who may make it difficult to reach and treat victims (Okumura, 1998a).
LIKELY MALADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO HeW EVENTS
Domains ofFunctioning Affected By Traumatic Events
Although responses to traumatic events vary widely, human adaptation to loss is lasting, rather than brief duration, and can be accompanied by adverse health consequences (Green, 1994; Murphy, 1999b; North, 1999) . A body of research findings resulting from Type I traumatic events that also might be relevant for a BCW event identifies four major domains of human responses following traumatic exposure: • Emotional responses include shock, terror, guilt, horror, irritability, anxiety, hostility, and depression. • Cognitive responses include inability to concentrate, confusion, self blame, intrusive thoughts (e.g., flashbacks) about the experience, decreased sense of self efficacy, fear of losing additional control over life events, and fear of reoccurrence of the event.
• Biological responses include sleep disturbance (e.g.,
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insomnia, nightmares), exaggerated startle response, and psychosomatic symptoms. • Behavioral responses include avoidance, social withdrawal, interpersonal stress (e.g., decreased intimacy and lowered trust in others), and substance abuse.
All of these maladaptive responses profoundly affect individuals' coping abilities. Type I post traumatic reaction frequently includes all four domains (Green, 1994; Meichenbaum, 1994; Murphy, 1999a; Shariat, 1999) .
Maladaptive Mental Stress Disorders
In response to an extreme stressor, such as a BCW attack, an individual may experience an acute stress disorder (ASD) or PTSD (APA, 1994) . The trauma exposure criteria for ASD and PTSD are identical. Individuals are exposed to a traumatic event that (APA, 1994): • Involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others. • Causes the person to respond with intense fear, helplessness, or horror.
To meet APA diagnostic criteria for an ASD, an individual must have several dissociative symptoms for at least 2 days following traumatic exposure. This includes a subjective sense of detachment or "emotional numbing," a reduced awareness of surroundings (e.g., "being in a daze"), experiencing the world as "unreal" or "dreamlike," and difficulty recalling specific details of the event (APA, 1994) .
Some evidence has been found that a prior history of psychiatric disorders or certain personality characteristics might predispose certain individuals to PTSD or other stress related symptoms (McFarlane, 1988) . However, one finding from the research on etiology of PTSD is that the nature, magnitude, and scope of the traumatic event or disaster-especially when it is massive-is usually more important than a history of mental disorders, personality variables, or demographic variables (Green, 1994) . One important point for occupational health nurses to consider, is that they may not be able to predict who, how, and to what extent specific individuals will evidence maladaptive emotional reactions in the face of an actual BCW attack.
Although generally considered to be less severe, adjustment disorders to stressors, such as traumatic events, also can occur (APA, 1994) . These adjustment disorders may be acute or chronic, and are associated with depressed mood, anxiety, or disturbances of conduct. The distress associated with adjustment disorders is, by definition, in excess of what would be expected from exposure to a particular stressor. It is also possible that a BCW event could precipitate another anxiety syndrome, such as a panic disorder, a major depressive episode, or more rarely, a psychotic disturbance. Table  2 summarizes some of the likely maladaptive psychological reactions or mental disorders that might arise because of threats or actual BCW events.
A number of diagnostic interviews, and valid and reliable paper and pencil tests, have been used to assess ASD and PTSD in various populations. For example, the Stanford Acute Stress Reaction Questionnaire has been used to measure and document symptoms of an ASD (Cardena, 2000) and the Clinician Administered Dissociate Stress Scale has been used to assess the "depersonalization" and "de-realization" often noted in individuals with ASD (Bremmer, 1998) . A structured interview, the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale, has been developed and widely used in the diagnosis of PTSD (Blake, 1990) . A number of paper and pencil tests are also available to assess PTSD symptomatology, including the Keane-Penk PTSD scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Keane, 1984; Watson, 1986) , the Trauma Symptom Inventory (Briere, 1995) , and the brief, 15 item Impact of Event Scale (Joseph, 2000) . However, it is important to note that these interview schedules and psychometric tests have been used rarely, if at all, with victims of BCW.
If there has been an actual exposure to a biological or chemical agent, it will be necessary to conduct a differential diagnosis to rule an organic symptoms of the particular biological or chemical agent. Although biological and psychological symptoms of a BCW attack are not mutually exclusive, during the acute phase, such a failure to accurately diagnose an exposure could prove fatal. For example, motor agitation could be a symptom of an anxiety disorder or a symptom of a neurotoxin exposure. On the other hand, confusing anxiety symptoms in civilians who may have been present at, witnessed, or been near a BCW attack, may result in large number of worried well individuals. These individuals may overwhelm the emergency medical system (e.g., the 4,000+ hospital "walk ins" following the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway) or receive unnecessary treatment (e.g., inappropriate use of antibiotics).
ROLE OF OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSES
Because the threat of terrorist attacks on workplaces in the United States is real, and because any BCW event APRIL 2002, VOL. 50, NO.4 will likely have profound psychological and behavioral consequences, what can and should occupational health nurses do?
Educate
Nurses must educate themselves, the public (potential consumers of care), and current clients. Knowledge is generally more reassuring than rumor and misinformation (e.g., "anthrax is not contagious"). Reliable and up to date information is provided on the Internet by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention at http:// www.cdc.gov with a direct link to bioterrorism updates at http://www.bt.cdc.gov. For instance, in relation to chemical weapons, the effects of most nerve gases released outdoors are attenuated rapidly because they are volatile and, depending on atmospheric temperature, may evaporate (SBCCOM, I999b).
Risk Assessments
Occupational health nurses are uniquely qualified to help during a BCW event by virtue of their health care training, and by their preparatory coursework in toxicology. Furthermore, they are positioned in the community to assess the risk of BCW terrorist events at their workplaces. While no workplace is immune from such BCW threats, certain industries, corporations, and sites might be targeted for terrorist attacks based on their symbolic value, the products they manufacture, or the service they provide. Because of their training and increasing knowledge of BCWs, occupational health nurses might well assist in early diagnoses of clandestine bioweapon or chemical attacks on their worksites by recognizing worker signs, symptoms, or symptom clusters in groups of workers.
Policy Formulation
Occupational health nurses also have the knowledge and training to assist management in formulating and implementing effective policies to respond to the threat of biological and chemical terrorism (e.g., policies should include, at a minimum, plans to contact and coordinate their diagnostic efforts with local health or law enforcement agencies). Employers should have a proactive emergency plan to respond to an actual BCW attack, or even to the credible threat of such an attack. A corporate entity needs to speak with one informed voice about the level of threat or the post-disaster response plan. Occupational health nurses have the knowledge and expertise to assist management in these efforts.
Psychosocial Triage
Finally, many occupational health nurses have the mental health training and possess the requisite psychosocial skills needed to reassure most apprehensive workers (e.g., the worried well), and to recognize the signs and symptoms of more serious psychiatric disorders (e.g., PTSD, severe depression) in survivors who may be actual victims or co-victims of a BCW event.
Debriefing is a popular, though controversial, intervention that can be offered shortly after a BCW disaster. The 
Timing of Psychosocial Interventions for Biological or Chemical Terrorist Threats and Events
Timeframe Intervention
Pre-event; no specific threat Education, reassurance, perspective on risk Pre-event; credible threat Focused education on agent, highlight disaster policy and planning Peri-traumatic (minutes to 24 hours) First priority is physical health of survivors; implement disaster plandepends on nature of agent. Peri-traumatic (48 hours to 72 hours)
Consider debriefing or one to one crisis counseling for survivors; normalizing Acute (days to 1 month)
Counseling available to treat acute stress disorder or other psychiatric syndromes emerging Chronic (months to years)
Long term psychotherapy or psychotropic medications.
co-victims may need and benefit from short term counseling or debriefing. Psychological responses, such as grief, to any traumatic event are highly individualized. Table 3 shows some of the likely time frames and related interventions for BCW threats and events. There are a number of commonalties in human reactions to trauma addressed in this article that might help occupational health professionals, employers, and employees to better cope with BCW terrorist threats and to anticipate the acute and long term reactions of employees (or managers) to a BCW terrorist event.
In conclusion, the experiences of those involved in previous traumatic events can enlighten us regarding what to expect from current and future biological and chemical terrorist attacks. Although more information is needed regarding individual differences in response to the same event, the literature is clear that both primary and secondary responses to stressors occur. Thus, it is important to consider both those who experience direct effects of a terrorist attack and the responders to be at some degree of risk for maladaptive responses described in this article. Although the section pertaining to the roles of occupational health nurses is quite brief, we expect knowledge in this area to grow as more and more nurses document their experiences following terroristic events.
